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Task Force (MAGTF) because its demise deprives land forces of a fire support platform that can achieve and sustain massed surprise fires.
Decline of the American Battleship
Even as the USS Missouri lay at anchor in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 to serve as the site of the formal surrender of the Empire of Japan, the leadership of the United States Navy had already determined that the role and performance of the aircraft carrier had eclipsed that of its fierce and dreaded battleships. That the carrier with its aircraft, increased striking range, and inherent advantages over battleships in naval surface action would supplant the battleship as the capital ship of the fleet was inevitable.
Deemed by the Navy to be impractical for full-time continued The Navy high command is determined to get rid of the battleships, relying for support on an expensive new destroyer at least 10 years in the future. This is how Washington works. Defense contractors, Pentagon bureaucrats, congressional staffers and career-minded officers make this decision that may ultimately be paid for by Marine and Army infantrymen. Yet Navy has progressed with the fire support platform programs on its cruisers and frigates only insofar as necessary to By combining land assault support in a platform that also possesses reliable and effective anti-air, anti-surface, and antisubmarine warfare capabilities, the Navy has doused any hope that the proven and capable battleship would survive in future defense authorization and spending bills. Novak also observes:
Marine desire to reactivate the Iowa and Wisconsin runs counter to the DD(X) destroyer of the future. It will not be ready before 2015, costing between $4.7 billion and $7 billion. Keeping the battleships in reserve costs only $250,000 a year, with reactivation estimated at $500 million (taking six months to a year) and full modernization more than $1.5 billion (less than two years). I would hate to see a premature demise of the battleships . . . without a suitable replacement on station. In my personal experience in combat, the battleship is the most effective naval fire support platform in the history of naval warfare. Where the battleship's weaponry really separates itself from the Navy's fire support of the future is in its employment. With nine guns that can fire simultaneously, battleships can achieve surprising and unparalleled massed fires on a target and sustain that fire. The AGS, with only two guns capable of firing at a higher rate, simply cannot.
Marines can easily translate this equation to its inevitable conclusion: The battleship still possesses more killing power than its naval surface fire support replacement. In addition to effective degrees of responsiveness and accuracy, anyone who has faced an enemy has most likely desired a fire support system that delivers massed fires and the effect of a full sheaf or broadside as opposed to a system capable of delivering only one or two rounds at a time. The Navy has already proposed a reduction of the total number of DDXs to be fielded from the original 24 to 8 to 12. 10 Some of these financial resources can then be dedicated to reactivating, modernizing, and maintaining one, two, or several battleships.
These different classes of ships could serve alongside one another in providing accurate and responsive fire support to forces ashore.
Conclusion
In the Navy's haste to pursue a high technology future, it has surrendered a cornerstone of its combat power. Viewed by Navy leadership as an expensive fire support platform that drained resources from other more desirable programs, battleships have been phased out. Similar to the words spoken by General Vandergrift when defending the existence of the Marines, Navy leadership must certainly say to itself, "If the battleship has not made a case for itself as a deadly, effective, and essential fire support platform in over one hundred years, then it must go." Most would argue that the American battleship has consistently made just such a case and is capable of continuing to do so well into the twenty-first century.
